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I.

INTRODUCTION

The members of this Court may recall the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”)
flowcharts that they made in law school. As these charts revealed, in sales of goods disputes, the
UCC provides a step-by-step method of determining the parties’ rights and obligations, and—
when used properly—should resolve a variety of commercial conundrums. Where appropriate,
the UCC sends any disputed issues of material fact to the jury.
But, in this case involving a sale of 3,000 tons of hay, the district court did not follow the
UCC’s stepwise process, did not give deference to the summary judgment standard, and jumped
to the conclusion that Appellant Harry’s Dairy, LLC (“Harry’s Dairy”) had breached the contract
and Respondent Jeff Good had not. The district court’s conclusion was achieved by giving undue
weight to Mr. Good’s version of the facts and ignoring Harry’s Dairy’s contrary evidence. Due
to the failure to recognize the disputed factual issues, in addition to a number of errors of law, the
district court sent only the question of damages to the jury.
The district court’s decision on liability was improper because there were many, many
issues of fact for the jury to decide, as set forth in the Appellant’s opening brief. Throughout
Mr. Good’s Respondent’s Brief, he continues to argue the facts—showing that this case was not
appropriate for summary judgment. In this reply, Harry’s Dairy refutes particular materially
incorrect (or disputed) statements of fact and law as set forth in Mr. Good’s brief. As argued in
Appellant’s briefs, this was a case for the jury, and the district court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of Mr. Good.
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II.
A.

REPLY ARGUMENT

Numerous Issues of Fact Remain on the Dueling Breach of Contract Claims,
Demonstrating That Summary Judgment Was Inappropriate.
The breach of contract dispute between Harry’s Dairy and Mr. Good involves the 2,000

tons of hay that were never delivered to Harry’s Dairy, not the 1,000 tons that were delivered and
paid for. In his brief, Mr. Good ignores the summary judgment standard, and continues to argue
the facts—stating that the Good hay was not moldy, and Harry’s Dairy simply could not pay for
it (despite Harry’s Dairy’s owner, Mr. Harry DeHaan, showing up at the dairy in spring of 2016
with a blank check and a readiness to inspect the remaining tons of hay). Rather, Harry’s Dairy
endeavored to keep the contractual relationship intact while protecting its rights. In contrast, Mr.
Good was under financial pressure to move the hay, and sought to escape the installment contract
by declaring a breach at the first sign of difficulty and immediately selling the hay to other
buyers.
Regarding Mr. Good’s breach of contract claim against Harry’s Dairy, the jury should
have been allowed to consider, first, whether Harry’s Dairy’s request to inspect the hay in April
2016 was reasonable and was requested within a reasonable time. If the answers to these
questions are “yes,” Harry’s Dairy had no further obligation regarding the remaining 2,000 tons
of hay, and Mr. Good repudiated the contract by failing to allow for an inspection. This analysis
is the same whether the contract is an installment contract or not. And, if Harry’s Dairy’s
rejection was due, there was an important issue of fact regarding whether Harry’s Dairy’s April
2016 notices were timely notices of rejection of the remaining 2,000 tons of hay, and whether
Harry’s Dairy was in material breach before it issued the notices of rejection to Mr. Good.
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The jury should have also decided whether prior nonconformities “substantially
impaired” the contract, or at least made appropriate a request for reasonable assurances on
Harry’s Dairy’s behalf. If so, Harry’s Dairy had no obligation regarding the remaining 2,000 tons
and was entitled to sue Mr. Good for damages for the cover hay.
1.

The jury should have decided whether Harry’s Dairy’s acceptance or
rejection of the remaining 2,000 tons was due given Mr. Good’s refusal to
allow an inspection.

A reasonable jury could find that Harry’s Dairy has absolutely no liability for the
remaining 2,000 tons because Mr. Good refused its inspection request—a lawful request whether
the contract is an installment contract or not. “An ‘installment contract’ is one which requires or
authorizes the delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted. . .” Idaho Code § 282-612(1) (emphasis added). In turn, for all contracts, Idaho Code § 28-2-606(1) provides for
three modes of acceptance by a buyer:
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to
the seller that the goods are conforming or that he will take or
retain them in spite of their nonconformity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of section
28-2-602), but such acceptance does not occur until the buyer has
had a reasonable opportunity to inspect them; or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership; but if
such act is wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if
ratified by him.
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Id. And, acceptance of some of the goods is not, therefore, acceptance of the whole—a buyer
may choose to accept any commercial units and reject the rest. Idaho Code § 28–2–601(c). A
“bale” is specifically defined as a commercial unit. Idaho Code § 28-2-105(6).
A buyer’s right to inspect the goods is defined in Idaho Code § 28-2-513(1), which
provides that a buyer has a right before payment or acceptance to inspect the goods tendered or
delivered at any reasonable place and time and in any reasonable manner. Id. “The concepts of a
reasonable time period for rejection and a reasonable opportunity to inspect under I.C. s 28-2606(1)(b) necessarily overlap.” G & H Land & Cattle Co. v. Heitzman & Nelson, Inc., 102 Idaho
204, 207, 628 P.2d 1038, 1041 (1981). “[W]hat constitutes a reasonable time within which the
buyer must make an inspection of the goods to determine whether they are conforming is a
question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact.” Id. at 208, 628 P.2d at 1042 (citing cases).
“[S]everal factors relevant to whether a reasonable time has passed for inspection and rejection
are: (1) the difficulty in discovering the defect; (2) the terms of the contract; (3) the relative
perishability of the goods; and (4) the course of performance after the sale and before the formal
rejection.” Figueroa v. Kit-San Co., 123 Idaho 149, 158, 845 P.2d 567, 576 (Ct. App. 1992)
(citing J. White and R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 8–3, p. 362 (3rd. ed. 1988)).
There is therefore no triggering of acceptance until an inspection happens (or a
reasonable time for inspection has passed), and there indisputably was never an inspection of the
remaining 2,000 tons, despite Harry’s Dairy’s request to do so. In April 2016, Mr. Good was
facing financial difficulties, and was under pressure to increase the pace of Harry’s Dairy’s
hauling. See R. Vol. II, p. 793 (Deposition of Robert B. Barnes, p. 44, ll. 9-13); R. Vol. I, pp.
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229-48 (text messages between Vivian Good and Jennifer Cummins). Mr. Good therefore
demanded that Harry's Dairy haul the other 2,000 tons of hay immediately, despite no time for
performance specified in the contract. See R. Vol. I, pp. 519-21.
In response, Mr. Harry DeHaan, together with his hay hauler (Mr. Tom Callen), and a
blank check in hand, traveled to the Good farm to make arrangements for the other 2,000 tons.
R. Vol. II, pp. 723-24, L. 9-10. In view of the previous mold issues, discovered only after
delivery, and the accompanying freight for hauling the hay both ways, Mr. DeHaan proposed
inspecting for mold on the farm. R. Vol. I, pp. 522-24. Mr. Good, however, rejected this request,
and did not allow Mr. DeHaan "to inspect the hay, have the hay inspected by a third party, or to
reject non-conforming, moldy hay." R. Vol. II, pp. 723-24, L. 9-10. In his Respondent's Brief,
Mr. Good did not respond to Harry's Dairy's argument regarding the post-purchase inspection,
and apparently concedes that Harry's Dairy had a right to inspect but was refused its right to do
so. See Respondent's Brief, passim.
A post-contracting inspection was critical in this case because bales became more readily
available for inspection as time went on. As Harry's Dairy worked further into the stacks, the
mold became more apparent. R. Vol. I, p. 525. 1 While Ms. Cummins sampled the hay before the
confirmatory letter, it was impossible to fully inspect the hay for mold. R. Vol. II, p. 714, L. 3-4;
R. Vol. II, p. 696. As she explained, "The hay was stacked four bales high, four bales wide, and

1

This email was apparently sent through an inquiry form on Mr. Dinius's website, hence
its odd appearance. Compare R. Vol. I, p. 525 with p. 526.
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thirty to fifty bales long. I was only able to obtain samples from bales on the outsides of the
stacks as the inside bales were not accessible to me.” R. Vol. II, p. 714, L. 3.
Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that the request to inspect the
remaining 2,000 tons at the Good farm in April 2016 was reasonable and timely, and therefore its
time to accept or reject the 2,000 tons had not yet accrued. See R. Vol. II, pp. 894-96. If a jury
did so find, Harry’s Dairy has no obligation regarding the remaining 2,000 tons, and Mr. Good
repudiated the contract (see Idaho Code § 28-2-610, Anticipatory Repudiation) by not allowing
the inspection.
(a)

Even if rejection or acceptance of the 2,000 tons was due, the April
2016 communications were a sufficient notice of rejection.

Mr. Good states there is no evidence of a notice of rejection of hay in the record.
Respondent’s Brief, p. 30. As explained in the previous section, Harry’s Dairy was not yet
required to accept or reject the remaining 2,000 tons, because Mr. Good did not allow for an
inspection. But, even if Harry’s Dairy time to inspect had expired, and it was required to accept
or reject, the April 2016 letter was a sufficient rejection of the 2,000 remaining tons.
In Figueroa v. Kit-San Company, the Court of Appeals was presented with similar issues
regarding the notice of rejection. 123 Idaho 149, 845 P.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1992). A seller of
bentonite clay had sued the buyer for breach of contract. Id. at 158, 845 P.2d at 576. The parties
disputed when rejection had occurred—either in October 1984 when the buyer phoned the seller
and told him that the bentonite did not conform to the contract, or later in May 1985, when the
buyer sent a letter denying liability. Id. That letter denied liability for the nonconforming
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bentonite and claimed that the seller misrepresented its product, supplied improper bentonite, and
demanded that the issues be cured or the seller must remove the bentonite. Id. at 155, 845 P.2d at
573.
The district court held that the phone call was not a rejection, but merely a notice of
nonconformance, but the May 1985 letter was a notice of rejection. Id. at 158, 845 P.2d at 576.
The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the May 1985 letter, denying liability for the goods,
was a sufficient notice of rejection. Id. The Court of Appeals further held that, under the
circumstances, the notice of rejection that was sent 200 days after delivery was sent within a
reasonable time. Id. at 158-59, 845 P.2d at 576-77.
On April 25, 2016, Mr. DeHaan emailed Mr. Good’s counsel, and stated “I am willing to
buy, as I have agreed, the dairy quality hay. I will not take the moldy, or damaged hay hidden
within the pile. From your letter, I presume that your position is that I take all the hay
conforming or not. . . I did not agree to buy moldy hay, nor did I agree to accept the risk of
undisclosed damage.” R. Vol. I, p. 525. On April 28, 2016, Mr. DeHaan sent Mr. Good’s counsel
a formal letter, stating that “We will accept merchantable, fit for the purpose hay. We will not
accept hay that will poison our cattle.” Id., p. 524. The letter went on to suggest that a third party
determine which hay was conforming to the contract and should be shipped to Harry’s Dairy. Id.
The April 25, 2016 email and April 28, 2016 letter were sufficient notices of Harry’s
Dairy rejection of the hay in the absence of an inspection or third party assistance in selecting the
hay for shipping. Like the letter denying liability in the absence of a cure in Figueroa, the
communications were “sufficiently formal to notify [the seller] of [the buyer’s] intent. . . .”
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Figueroa, 123 Idaho at 158, 845 P.2d at 576; cf Silver Creek Seed, LLC v. Sunrain Varieties,
LLC, 161 Idaho 270, 277, 385 P.3d 448, 455 (2016) (District court did not err in concluding
there was no genuine issue of material fact that buyer accepted potatoes, where "[t]here was no
objective action taken by Sunrain to avoid acceptance of the potatoes, only vague subjective
statements claiming that rejection had been communicated.")2
Therefore, even if Harry's Dairy's time for inspection had expired, a reasonable jury
could have found that the April 2016 notices sufficiently communicated rejection of the
remaining tons in the absence of an inspection or cure of the mold problem.
(i)

Harry's Dairy was not in material breach before the
April 2016 notice for failure to haul, as there is no timeto-haul requirement in the contract, and Mr. Good
apparently concedes this point.

In its decision on reconsideration, the district court found that the April 2016 notice of
rejection was ineffective, as "it is this Court's view that Harry's Dairy was in breach before
Good's demand letter and Harry DeHaan's response to the demand letter. Specifically, the Dairy
was in breach for failing to pay as agreed to in the contract ('we agreed to pay you in thirds') and
for ceasing taking delivery of the hay." R. Vol. II, p. 970. Thus, the district court's decision
regarding notice of rejection is predicated on the finding that Harry's Dairy was in breach before
the April 2016 exchange of correspondence. See id.

2

Additionally, as explained in Harry's Dairy's opening brief, there were other
conversations between the parties putting Mr. Good on notice that the hay was being rejected, in
the absence of an inspection by Harry's Dairy or other third party. Appellant's Brief, p. 21.
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As for the alleged breach that Harry’s Dairy had “ceased” taking delivery of hay, Mr.
Good does not respond at all to Harry’s Dairy’s argument that the parties’ agreement left time to
haul completely up to Harry’s Dairy’s discretion. See Respondent’s Brief, passim. Mr. Good
makes no argument on a reasonable time to haul. Id. Mr. Good is thus apparently conceding the
point that there is no time-to-haul requirement in the parties’ contract, and the district court erred
in finding that Harry’s Dairy was in breach for failure to haul before its inspection
demand/rejection in April 2016.
Even if Harry’s Dairy were in breach, the breach would only excuse Mr. Good from
performance if Harry’s Dairy’s breach were a substantial impairment of the parties’ contract, and
therefore a prior material breach. As explained in Harry’s Dairy’s opening brief, there was a
question of fact regarding whether any breach on Harry’s Dairy’s part was a substantial
impairment of the contract. Appellant’s Brief, pp. 25-26.
A reasonable jury could certainly find that Harry’s Dairy was not in material breach for
failure to timely haul the hay prior to the April 2016 notice of rejection of the remaining 2,000
tons, and it should have been allowed to do so.
(ii)

Harry’s Dairy’s was not in breach of the payment terms
before the April 2016 notice of rejection.

Moreover, Harry’s Dairy was not in material breach of the “payment-in-thirds”
requirement before the April 2016 communications. First, although the letter stated that “[w]e
agreed to pay you in third’s” the written letter went on to modify those terms:
As you know, the last half of 2015 has been especially difficult for
the dairy business. Milk prices have taken a serious hit from their
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previous highs. I make an effort to run my dairy with as little debt
from the bank as possible. But this means, since we talked, with
the lower milk prices my cash flow has gotten tighter and I have to
be extra disciplined. I have to spread the money out a little
further, which means I need to pay you in smaller, but more
frequent installments. That’s why this enclosed check is for
$25,000. We really like your hay and want to build a relationship
with you so we can work together in the future. We think a big
part of running a successful dairy is having good relationships with
our vendors. We won’t haul any hay we don’t pay for and we
hope this new arrangement will also work for you. If you have any
questions or concerns, please give me, Trent or Jennifer a call.
R. Vol. I, p. 31 (emphasis added). Mr. Good did not respond to the letter, but cashed the
$25,000.00 check. R. Vol. I, p. 69, L. 9-10. Obviously, $25,000.00 was not a third of the price
for the 3,000 tons of hay. Additionally, Ms. Cummins testified that the agreement was payment
in $25,000.00 chunks, not in thirds. R. Vol. I, p. 173 (Deposition of Jennifer Cummins, p. 26,
ll. 2-22). Therefore, there was a material issue of fact regarding what the payment terms even
were.
But, even if the agreement called for prepaying a third at a time, there is no specification
in the contract for the time to pay for a third and haul a third. In fact, Harry’s Dairy had paid
fully for a third of the hay ($112,978.49), and had hauled a third of the tonnage at the time of the
April 2016 demand letter, although the parties disputed whether Mr. Good was owed for some
loads Harry’s Dairy believes were never delivered. R. Vol. I, p. 361, L. 72; R. Vol. I, p. 336 (“As
it stands, Jeff has approximately 2,000 tons of hay waiting to be delivered to your dairy.”); R.
Vol. I, p. 498, L. 9. Therefore, Harry’s Dairy was not in breach of the payment-in-thirds
requirement before Mr. Good’s April 2016 letter.

-10-

Additionally, since this was an installment contract, there is an issue of fact regarding
whether any payment issues resulted in a “substantial impairment” of the contract, and therefore
a prior material breach. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 25-26; c.f. Magic Valley Foods, Inc. v. Sun
Valley Potatoes, Inc., 134 Idaho 785, 789, 10 P.3d 734, 738 (2000) (Potato buyer significantly
impaired value of the contract by failing to pay for potatoes within 30 days of delivery.)
Similarly, there was an issue of fact regarding whether Mr. Good acquiesced in Harry’s
Dairy paying for the hay as it hauled it, and whether this operated as a waiver or modification.
See Idaho Code § 28-2-209 (“Modification, rescission and waiver”); Idaho Code § 28-1-303(f)
(“Subject to section 28-2-209, Idaho Code, a course of performance is relevant to show a waiver
or modification of any term inconsistent with the course of performance.”)
Further, Mr. Good states that “it remains uncontested” that Harry’s Dairy could not pay
for the hay. Respondent’s Brief, p. 33. But, it is untrue that Harry’s Dairy could not pay for the
loads. In fact, Harry DeHaan showed up at the Good farm to inspect with a blank check in hand
and a hay hauler, intending to haul the non-moldy bales. R. Vol. II, pp. 723-24, L. 9.
Additionally, the allegation that Harry’s Dairy could not pay for the hay is inconsistent with the
fact that Harry’s Dairy purchased cover hay on the open market at a higher price, resulting in
damages. Id., L. 8. While Mr. Good has argued that Harry’s Dairy was trying to avoid the
contract because the hay market was down, that is belied by the fact that Harry’s Dairy spent
much more on cover hay. There was no reason for Harry’s Dairy to refuse Mr. Good’s hay.
The district court therefore erred in finding that Harry’s Dairy was in breach of the
payment terms before the April 2016 communications. A reasonable jury could find that Harry’s
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Dairy was not in breach, or even if in breach, the payment abnormalities were not a substantial
impairment of the contract.

2.

Whether there was one or many moldy loads in the 1,000 tons that were
delivered is not critical to Harry's Dairy's case regarding the 2,000
undelivered tons.

Mr. Good continues to state that there was only one load of moldy hay in the 1,000 tons
delivered. See Respondent's Brief, p. 12 ("Other than the 30 bales of hay there were no other
problems noted with the 22 loads of hay.") 3 Whether there was one or many loads of multiple
hay is not significant to this appeal. If the contract is an installment contract, it is evaluated under
the "substantial impairment" doctrine. Idaho Code § 28-2-612. Substantial impairment only
requires one nonconforming installment. Id., subsection 3 ("Whenever nonconformity or default
with respect to one or more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract
there is a breach of the whole.") (emphasis added).
But, even if relevant to the analysis, it is incorrect to state that there was evidence of only
one nonconforming installment.
First, apart from the December 2015 load, there was another moldy load rejected on
March 4, 2016. R. Vol. I, p. 189 (Depo. of Harry DeHaan, p. 51, 11. 4-15). Mr. Good failed to pay
for the return freight and so the load remained at the Wendell dairy. Id., 11.. 19-22. That load was

3

In support of this proposition, Mr. Good cites the DeHaan depo. at p. 49, 11. 4-9 (R. Vol.
I, p. 189). However, a review of the deposition shows that the testimony related to whether or not
there was a written notation in Mr. DeHaan's records regarding mold in any other loads apart
from the load rejected on December 29, 2015, from the time period of December 17, 2015
through January 27, 2016. See id.
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set aside, and later tested positive for mold. Id., p. 257, passim. Mr. Good disputes that this load
came from the Good farm. See Respondent’s Brief, p. 14. Thus, this remains a disputed issue of
material fact for the jury.
Second, there was also record evidence that several individuals noted the presence of
mold in the hay from Mr. Good’s farm. Harry’s Dairy’s employees as well as Jennifer Cummins
and Mr. DeHaan viewed mold in multiple loads of hay from the Good farm. R. Vol. II, p. 715, L.
7-9, p. 722, L. 4, p. 723, L. 6-8, p. 724, L. 13. The presence of mold required Harry’s Dairy’s
employees to sort through moldy bales. Id., Vol. I, pp. 256-57, passim. Mr. Argyle (nutritionist)
and Mr. Aguirre (dairy manager) both noted moldy hay at the dairies. R. Vol. I, p. 260. Harry’s
Dairy’s veterinarian also viewed moldy hay at the dairies in December 2015. R. Vol. I, p. 430.
And contrary to the Respondent’s Brief (page 22, footnote 198), Mr. Barnes (Mr. Good’s
testifying expert) admitted that there was mold in some of the hay. R. Vol. II, p. 799 (Deposition
of Robert B. Barnes, p. 71, ll. 10-14). But, Harry’s Dairy, in a show of good faith, continued to
take delivery of the hay and try to work with the hay, despite the mold. R. Vol. II, p. 715, L. 8-9,
p. 717.
Third, there is circumstantial evidence of molding. Mr. Good admitted to a method of
stacking and baling hay that would contribute to molding. The bales were stacked to deal with
rain. R. Vol. I, p. 164 (Deposition of Jeff Good, p. 17, ll. 5-17). And, Mr. Good admitted there
was rain in the area on October 2015. Id.
Fourth, there were other issues besides mold that support a finding of substantial
impairment of the contract. For example, it was apparent Mr. Good did not follow industry
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standard in several ways. As testified by Ms. Cummins and Mr. DeHaan, it is industry custom to
not test for mold, on the understanding that the grower would recognize the danger to animals
and would retain any moldy loads. R. Vol. II, p. 714, L. 3-4; R. Vol. I, pp. 413, 415, 498, L. 7.
But, Mr. Good did not follow this industry standard, and insisted on loading all bales, regardless
of mold content. R. Vol. II, p. 715, L. 7. From Harry’s Dairy’s point of view, the refusal to hold
back moldy loads substantially impaired the contract, because the loads had to be hauled to
Harry’s Dairy’s locations at its expense, opened and inspected, and hauled back to Mr. Good’s
farm. R. Vol. I, pp. 410-11. A major reason for purchasing from Mr. Good was the proximity to
the dairies and the cost saving on freight that could be achieved. See id.
Moreover, the Goods were demanding payment and hauling at a frequency that was not
specific in the contract, showing an unwillingness to follow the contract and demanding that
their customer accept nonconforming goods. E.g., R. Vol. II, pp. 715-16, L. 10. Later on, Mr.
Good would hire counsel and refuse an inspection of the remaining 2,000 loads. R. Vol. II, p.
723-24, L. 9-10. These facts—showing Mr. Good’s reluctance to follow industry standard and
continue the contractual relationship in any sort of cooperative manner—create a genuine dispute
regarding whether the contract was substantially impaired. See Midwest Mobile Diagnostic
Imaging, L.L.C. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 965 F. Supp. 1003 (1997), affirmed 165 F.3d 27
(W.D. Mich. 1997) (Existence of nonconformity resulting in substantial impairment of value of
installment, for purposes of UCC provision governing breach of installment contracts, depends
on facts and circumstances of each case, and can turn not only on quality of goods but also on
such factors as time, and the like.)
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At the very least, Harry's Dairy faced enough insecurity regarding Mr. Good's continuing
performance to justify its demand for adequate assurances, which was served in April 2016 (and
to which Mr. Good failed to respond to and instead filed suit ten days later). R. Vol. II, pp. 72324, L. 9-10; R. Vol. I, pp. 522-25. A jury could find-even if the contract was not substantially
impaired-that Harry's Dairy's demand for adequate assurances was justified, and that Mr. Good
repudiated when he failed to respond to the demand. These are questions that should have been
submitted to a jury.

B.

The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Warranty Claims.
Mr. Good would have this Court return to the old "caveat emptor" rules in effect before

the UCC 's enactment. But, the UCC has conclusively ended that doctrine in sales of goods by
creating rules related to express and implied warranties that protect the buyer. There were issues
of fact regarding whether Mr. Good made an express warranty that the hay was not subjected to
weather that would cause molding, and whether Harry's Dairy's pre-purchase inspection
excluded any warranties related to the defect of mold. 4 The warranty counterclaims should have
been sent to the jury.

4

Harry's Dairy's warranty claims relate primarily to damages resulting from the 1,000
tons of hay that were delivered, and which contained mold that impacted milk production and
caused damages to the herd. R. Vol. I, pp. 37-38. While a breach of warranty regarding mold
also relates to whether the contract was substantially impaired, the test for substantial impairment
requires only nonconforming goods. Section 28-2-612 uses the term "non-conformity or default."
Whether an installment of goods is nonconforming is a broader analysis than whether they
conform to a warranty: "Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are 'conforming'
or conform to the contract when they are in accordance with the obligations under the contract."
Idaho Code § 28-2-106(2). Nonconformity "includes not only breaches of warranties but also
(continued . . .)
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1.

Mr. Good's express warranty need not be written, and was not an opinion or
commendation as a matter of law.

First, Mr. Good claims that there is no express warranty because it is not in the written
confirmatory memorandum. Respondent's Brief, p. 37. However, the UCC specifically allows
for parol or extrinsic evidence. Idaho Code§ 28-2-202. There is no merger clause in the letter (R.
Vol. I, p. 31 )-or other evidence that suggests the contract was "a complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the agreement"-that would prevent an express warranty. Idaho Code
§ 28-2-202(b ). And, the UCC also allows for any express representations to be made part-andparcel of the transaction. Idaho Code § 28-2-313. Therefore, the lack of a written express
warranty is inconsequential.
Second, Mr. Good claims that his statement was merely an opinion or commendation, not
a warranty. Respondent's Brief, pp. 37-40. But, the statement is not an opinion or commendation
as a matter of law-an opinion or commendation means something very different. "[T]he test for
whether an express warranty exists is 'whether the seller assumes to assert a fact of which the
buyer is ignorant, or whether he merely states an opinion or expresses a judgment about a thing
as to which they may be expected to have an opinion and exercise a judgment."' Peacock v.

(... continued)
any failure of the seller to perform according to his obligations under the contract." Idaho Code §
28-2-714, cmt. 2. The UCC allows extrinsic evidence of the terms of the agreement including
"course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade." Idaho Code § 28-2-202(a).
Therefore, Harry's Dairy's warranty claims are not necessary for a finding that Mr. Good
breached the contract by providing non-conforming goods.
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Damon Corp., 458 F. Supp. 2d 411, 418 (W.D. Ky. 2006) (quoting Wedding v. Duncan, 310 Ky.
374, 220 S.W.2d 564, 567 (1949)).
Here, Mr. Good made a statement of fact of which Harry’s Dairy, the buyer, was
ignorant. Mr. Good represented, in response to a question by Trent Cummins, “that there had
been very little weather incidents in Melba over the past years and that the hay had not been
exposed to weather that would result in damage or mold to the hay.” R. Vol. II, p. 719, L. 5.
Whether Mr. Good made this statement and whether it formed an express warranty are questions
of fact for the jury. Keller v. Inland Metals All Weather Conditioning, Inc., 139 Idaho 233, 237,
76 P.3d 977, 981 (2003). As a matter of law, however, this is not a mere opinion or
commendation—it is a straightforward statement of fact.
Third, Mr. Good attempts to distinguish Keller by arguing the facts of Keller, stating Mr.
Good is not like the business owner in Keller. Mr. Good states: “the determination as to whether
the letter at issue created an express warranty was based on the consideration of the
circumstances in which the statements were made.” Respondent’s Brief, p. 39. Mr. Good’s
argument, as with the majority of his briefing, shows merely the existence of facts in dispute and
that the existence of an express warranty is an issue of fact for the jury, who are in the best
position to “consider the circumstances in which the statements were made.”
2.

There is an issue of fact regarding whether Hay Now, LLC’s pre-purchase
inspection negated any implied warranties.

Harry’s Dairy counterclaimed for breach of implied warranties of merchantability (Idaho
Code § 28-2-314) and fitness for a particular purpose (Idaho Code § 28-2-315). See R. Vol. II,
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pp. 583-85. Mr. Good defended these claims, first, by arguing that the implied warranties did not
survive Hay Now, LLC’s pre-purchase examination of the goods. R. Vol. I, pp. 146-50. The
basis of Mr. Good’s defense is that Hay Now should have tested for mold prior to purchase, but
did not. E.g., Respondent’s Brief, p. 41.
Idaho Code § 28-2-316(3)(b) provides: “when the buyer before entering into the contract
has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine
the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the
circumstances to have revealed to him.” Id. (emphasis added). Official comment 8 sets forth
when the examination “ought to have in the circumstances” revealed defects to a professional
buyer: “A professional buyer examining a product in his field will be held to have assumed the
risk as to all defects which a professional in the field ought to observe, while a nonprofessional
buyer will be held to have assumed the risk only for such defects as a layman might be expected
to observe.” Id. Where there is a factual dispute regarding which defects an examination should
reveal to the buyer under the circumstances, there is a question for the finder of fact. See, e.g.,
Driscoll v. Standard Hardware, Inc., 785 N.W.2d 805, 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
Once again, the jury should have decided whether Hay Now should have tested for the
defect of mold as professional buyer in the industry. Idaho Code § 28-2-316, cmt. 8. Hay Now
testified it was not customary for hay buyers to do so, and Mr. Good’s expert in fact agreed with
this proposition. R. Vol. I, p. 128, L. 9 (Declaration of Bob Barnes in Support of Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment) (“It is not my practice to submit hay samples to be tested for
mold . . . .”). Given how hay is stacked and stored, an industry custom has developed that hay
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need not be tested for mold prior to purchase, as the hay grower will retain all moldy loads. E.g.,
R. Vol. II, p. 714, L. 3, Vol. II, p. 875, L. 11. Despite this custom, Mr. Good has maintained that
Hay Now should have submitted hay samples for mold testing and assumed the risk of moldy
hay. See Respondent’s Brief, pp. 43-44. If a jury were to find that Hay Now, although a
professional buyer in the field, was excused from testing for mold, the implied warranties of
fitness and merchantability would pass in favor of Harry’s Dairy. Again, this is yet another issue
of fact for the jury.
Further, there was an issue of fact regarding whether the pre-purchase inspection “ought
in the circumstances to have revealed” the mold issue due to how the hay was stacked and the
fact that bales cannot be broken open. Vol. II, p. 875, L. 11. Bales themselves can only be
sampled from the outside of the stacks. R. Vol. II, p. 714, L. 3. Even if Hay Now should have
tested for mold, there was a question of whether Hay Now could have tested for mold, given that,
as Ms. Cummins explained, the stacks at the Good farm were “four bales high, four bales wide,
and thirty to fifty bales long.” Id.
Second, Mr. Good further argues that the implied warranties were excluded because
Harry’s Dairy was relying on Hay Now’s expertise in selecting the goods, not Mr. Good’s.
Respondent’s Brief, pp. 46-49. However, that argument is only relevant to the implied warranty
of fitness (Idaho Code § 28-2-315), which relies on the seller’s skill or judgment, not the implied
warranty of merchantability (Idaho Code § 28-2-314), which does not. Even if the implied
warranty of fitness does not apply given Hay Now’s role in brokering the hay, the implied
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warranty of merchantability will pass to Harry's Dairy so long as Hay Now is excused from
testing for mold.
Third, Mr. Good's argument that the implied warranties are excluded because they are
not contained in the December 11, 2015 confirmatory memorandum is unavailing. The cases
cited by Mr. Good are easily distinguishable-they predate the UCC (adopted in 1967 in Idaho 5)
and have minimal relevance here. Green v. Webster & Sons (77 Idaho 281, 291 P.2d 864 (1955))
and McMaster v. Warner (44 Idaho 544, 258 P. 547 (1927)). As explained above, parol evidence
is allowed under the UCC's sale of goods provisions, and whether express and implied
warranties attach to a transaction is governed by specific code provisions. Idaho Code § 28-2202; § 28-2-313; § 28-2-314-316. In particular, implied warranties arise not by agreement, but by
operation of law-hence they are implied.
To summarize, a reasonable jury could find that Hay Now was not required to test the
hay samples for mold and that under the circumstances the examination did not exclude the
implied warranties. The issue of implied warranties therefore should have been sent to the jury.

3.

A Reasonable jury could find that Harry's Dairy provided timely notice of
the breach of warranty claims.

The Uniform Commercial Code's requirements regarding notice of warranty breaches are
not particularly onerous. Idaho Code § 28-2-607(3)(a) provides: "Where a tender has been
accepted (a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have

5

Session Law 1967, ch. 161.
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discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy.... " The content
of the notice need only be sufficient to put the seller on notice that the sale is problematic:
The content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the
seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be
watched. There is no reason to require that the notification which
saves the buyer's rights under this section must include a clear
statement of all the objections that will be relied on by the buyer,
as under the section covering statements of defects upon rejection
(Section 2-605). Nor is there reason for requiring the notification
to be a claim for damages or of any threatened litigation or other
resort to a remedy. The notification which saves the buyer's rights
under this Article need only be such as informs the seller that the
transaction is claimed to involve a breach, and thus opens the way
for normal settlement through negotiation.
Id. (emphasis added), cmt. 4. Further, the notice need not be in any particular form, and may be

verbal: "The notice provision does not require any particular form of communication; therefore it
is not fatal to [the buyer's] claim that one year elapsed before written communication of the
breach occurred. Rather, the issue turns on whether notification was made within a reasonable
time and is a question of fact. ... " Meldco, Inc. v. Hollytex Carpet Mills, Inc., 118 Idaho 265,
269, 796 P.2d 142, 146 (Ct. App. 1990)(emphasis in original).
Whether a buyer gives a seller notice within a reasonable time after the buyer knew or
should have known of a breach is a question for the jury, "where reasonable minds might draw
different inferences from the probative facts." Full Circle, Inc. v. Schelling, 108 Idaho 634, 640,
701 P.2d 254, 260 (Ct. App. 1985); Murphy v. Etchegaray, 108 Idaho 814, 816, 702 P.2d 852,
854 (1985) review denied 116 Idaho 466, 776 P.2d 828 (Ct. App. 1985) (Question of reasonable
time for notice was issue for jury, and jury properly found that ewe buyer's notice to seller six
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months after sale of claim for breach of warranty based on low pregnancy rate and infections was
within “reasonable time” required by Idaho Code § 28-2-607(3)(a), in light of four-month sheep
gestation period and similar period of time required for veterinarians to establish reliable data for
flock.)
Inexplicably, Mr. Good argues that Harry’s Dairy never gave notice of the mold issue.
Respondent’s Brief, pp. 49-50. In the district court’s first decision it held: “Here, the facts
relating to notification are in heavy dispute. . . When Harry’s Dairy actually gave notice of mold
and whether it occurred within a reasonable time are both questions for the jury to decide.” R.
Vol. II, p. 586. On reconsideration, the district court held: “There simply is no evidence of any
communication from Harry’s Dairy to Good about mold in any hay that had been delivered until
DeHaan’s reply to the demand letter in April.” R. Vol. II, p. 844. The district court’s initial
decision was correct, because there was evidence of communications prior to the April 2016
communications, and those April 2016 communications themselves could be found by a
reasonable jury to be timely notices of warranty claims.
A reasonable jury could find that Mr. DeHaan’s replies to Mr. Good’s demand letter in
April 2016 were timely notices regarding the warranty breach. In Mr. DeHaan’s April 26, 2016
email, Mr. DeHaan clearly gives Mr. Good’s counsel notice that there is a problem of mold in
the hay. R. Vol. I, p. 525. The email states “When we hauled almost a third of the hay, we got
into mold problems. We sent some back, we mixed some with better hay, and generally tried to
accommodate.” Id. Likewise, Mr. DeHaan’s more formal letter to Mr. Good’s counsel on April
28, 2016 focuses mainly on the mold problem in Mr. Good’s hay. R. Vol. I, pp. 522-24.
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These communications occurred less than five months after the parties’ contracted, and
occurred in response to a demand letter. Previously, in her text messages, Ms. Cummins had not
said anything about the mold because she did not want to rock the boat. R. Vol. I, p. 176
(Deposition of Jennifer Cummins, p. 44, ll. 6-19). As time went on, the mold issue became more
apparent as Harry’s Dairy worked into the stacks that were not accessible at the time of
contracting. R. Vol. I, p. 525. Once Mr. Good escalated the dispute by hiring counsel and
sending the demand letter, Harry’s Dairy made clear its position that there was a systemic mold
problem. Id. Just because these communications are in response to a demand letter does not
disqualify them from being a timely notice of warranty breaches. Indeed, that fact suggests that
the notice was timely, as Harry’s Dairy attempted to maintain a good relationship with Mr. Good
for as long as possible. R. Vol. I, p. 176 (Deposition of Jennifer Cummins, p. 44, ll. 6-19) (“[I]t
was always my intention to try and preserve the relationship, so that we could haul what was
marketable and what was good, and leave what was bad.”). The Uniform Commercial Code
contemplates that parties to an installment contract will work through their differences in good
faith and in consideration of an ongoing relationship. See Idaho Code § 28-2-612, and official
comments.
Second, Mr. Good had been on notice of a mold problem for several months. In
December 2015, the moldy installment was returned. R. Vol. I, p. 189 (Deposition of Harry
DeHaan, pp. 48, ll. 9-25, p. 49, ll. 1-3). Although this load was rejected, not retained, it would be
reasonable for a jury to find that the rejection of the one load was notice of a mold problem
throughout the stacks of tightly-packed bales. After this rejection, Ms. Cummins went to the
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Good farm and told Mr. Good that there was a mold problem and it was dangerous for dairy
cattle. R. Vol. II, p. 715, L. 7 (“I also went out to the Good farm and discussed with Mr. Good
that moldy hay was unsuitable and dangerous for dairy cow consumption.”). Ms. Cummins
further told Mr. Good that “moldy hay would only end up being returned.” Id. Mr. Good admits
remembering that Ms. Cummins mentioned a mold problem at some point. R. Vol. I, p. 165,
(Deposition of Jeff Good, p. 22, ll. 16-21). Harry’s Dairy additionally rejected a load in March
2016 for mold, but Mr. Good never picked up the moldy load. R. Vol. I, p. 189, passim. As
explained above, a notice of a warranty breach need not be in writing, and given the minimal
requirements related to the content of the notice, the verbal communications here regarding mold
in both rejected and retained loads were sufficient to put Mr. Good on notice of a warranty claim.
A reasonable jury could find that these verbal and written communications to Mr. Good
about moldy hay were timely notices of a warranty breach. The jury should have been allowed to
assess the factual circumstances to determine if the notice was sufficient and timely. The district
court improperly took this issue from the jury.
C.

Reversing the Award of Summary Judgment is Consistent With Idaho’s Public
Policy That Cases Should be Resolved on Their Merits.
The district court failed to appreciate the various UCC issues involved in this case. At

first, the court, in its initial decision on summary judgment, found the following issues of fact:
1. Whether the implied warranty of merchantability was excluded by Hay Now’s
pre-purchase examination (R. Vol. II, p. 584);
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2. “When Harry’s Dairy actually gave notice of mold and whether it occurred
within a reasonable time are both questions for a jury to decide.” (R. Vol. II, p. 586);
3. “[T]he Court concludes that there remain genuine issues of fact regarding
which party breached the contract in this case.” (R. Vol. II, p. 587).
But the district court reversed course on reconsideration. Inexplicably, with very little
new evidence from Mr. Good, the district court appears to have made a credibility determination,
and found that:
1. The record evidence did not show any notice of mold to Mr. Good—despite
evidence of a number of verbal and written communications regarding mold (R. Vol. II, pp. 84344);
2. That, despite the refusal of the request for an inspection, the court found that
“Harry’s Dairy was given the opportunity to inspect and ought to have discovered the mold
issues, if they existed.” (R. Vol. II, p. 845);
3. “Upon reconsideration, the Court concludes that there is no dispute of fact that
the Defendant was not performing as required under the contract and did not provide any notice
of rejection and was therefore in breach.” (R. Vol. II, p. 846).
The district court’s decision on summary judgment prevented Harry’s Dairy from
receiving its day in court and its right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 7 of the Idaho
Constitution. “It has long been judicial policy in Idaho that controversies be determined and
disposed of each on its own particular facts and as substantial justice may require.” Bunn v.
Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 711, 587 P.2d 1245, 1246 (1978). Cases should be resolved on their
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substantive merits: “[a] determination [under Rule 1] entails a finding of the facts and an
application of the law in order to resolve the legal rights of the litigants who hope to resolve their
differences in the courts.” Id. at 712, 587 P.2d at 1247. “The general policy behind the current
rules of civil procedure is to provide every litigant with his or her day in court.” Clark v. Olsen,
110 Idaho 323, 325, 715 P.2d 993, 995 (1986).
While generally this policy is expressed in relation to judgments on procedural
technicalities, it is no less applicable here where the district court disregarded the summary
judgment standard and gave undue weight to one of the litigant’s versions of the facts. Harry’s
Dairy presented sufficient facts to withstand a grant of summary judgment in favor of Mr. Good,
and it should have had the right to present its version of the facts to the jury. Harry’s Dairy is
simply requesting this Court give it a chance at a fair hearing before the jury, consistent with
Idaho public policy.
D.

Mr. Good is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees or Costs on Appeal
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) mandates that the courts award attorney fees to the prevailing

party in a civil action involving a “commercial transaction.” Climax, LLC v. Snake River
Oncology of E. Idaho, PLLC, 149 Idaho 791, 798, 241 P.3d 964, 971 (2010). But, Mr. Good is
not entitled to fees at this stage of the proceeding because the award of summary judgment
should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. See Climax, LLC at id.
(declining to award fees under § 12–120(3) where award of summary judgment was reversed and
case was remanded). Since the judgment in this case should be vacated, and the case remanded
for a trial on the merits, there is no final decision on the prevailing party in the action.
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III.

CONCLUSION

A reasonable jury faced with the facts of this case could return any number of decisions
on its verdict form. For example, a reasonable jury could very well find that Harry's Dairy's
request for an inspection of the remaining 2,000 tons in April 2016 was reasonable and timely,
and Harry's Dairy had no obligation regarding those tons when Mr. Good refused the inspection
request. This is just one potential outcome within a countless number of scenarios. But, the jury
did not get a chance to decide the factual issues, as the district court usurped the jury's important
role in this UCC dispute. Harry's Dairy is entitled to have disputed factual issues decided by a
jury, consistent with Idaho's public policy. This Court should reverse the award of summary
judgment, vacate the judgment awarding damages to Mr. Good, and remand for a trial on the
merits.
DATED: July 29, 2019.
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